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I 
Doris has just driven her car into a tree. She's unconscious, slumped 
over the steering wheel. Perry comes upon the scene. He's shocked 
at what he finds. He looks around to see if anyone can help, but there's 
no one else there. He's wondering whether he should try to find a 
phone to call for aid, but visions of wrecked cars catching fire and 
exploding into roiling balls of flame fill his mind, and he feels that he 
must rescue the driver now or else she'll surely die. So, with consider- 
able trepidation, Perry rushes in and quickly drags Doris free from 
the wreck, thinking that at any moment both he and she might get 
caught in the explosion. At last, when he judges that they are far 
enough away from the car, he collapses, exhausted, onto the ground, 
with Doris lying in his arms. As it happens, the car does not explode. 
Within a couple of minutes, Perry hears sirens wailing. Soon after, 
some emergency vehicles screech to a halt. Paramedics jump out. They 
run over to Perry and Doris. Perry tells them what happened. The 
paramedics take a look at Doris, and they arrive at a chilling conclu- 
sion: Perry has paralyzed Doris. 
Is Perry morally responsible for what he has done? (Here, and 
henceforth, by "morally responsible" I shall mean "morally culpable," 
for other types of moral responsibility will not be at issue. Also, I shall 
omit the qualifier "moral(ly)," although it will always be implicit.) That 
depends. One thing it depends on is whether Perry acted freely in 
paralyzing Doris. There are some who deny that freedom is a prerequi- 
site of responsibility but, while this view deserves attention, I shall not 
attend to it here. 1 It is surely very plausible to assume, as indeed the vast 
* My thanks to Terry McConnell, Jim Montmarquet, the members of the Research 
Triangle Ethics Circle, and the editors of Ethics for astute comments on earlier drafts. 
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and Eugene Schlossberger, Moral Responsibility and Persons (Philadelphia: Temple Uni- 
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majority of people do appear to assume, that responsibility requires a 
sort of freedom (voluntariness, control), a sort that people are natu- 
rally understood to manifest in their everyday actions but which au- 
tomata, for instance, do not. (I hope I may be forgiven if I do not try 
to render this extremely familiar but also extremely complex notion 
more precisely here.) Moreover, it would be pretty surprising if Perry 
lacked such freedom when attempting to rescue Doris. 
(In saying that responsibility requires freedom, I do not mean 
that to be responsible for doing some act one must have acted freely 
at the time of doing it. While this may be true of Perry, it is not true 
of all responsible agents. After all-this is the stock example-a drunk 
driver may be responsible for the accident that he [or she] has caused, 
even though he was completely out of control at the time. But if he 
is, this is because he is responsible for being out of control, and this 
requires that, somewhere back down the line, he had been free to do 
other than he did. Freedom is thus what may be called a root require- 
ment of responsibility; if not directly free with respect to his having 
an accident, the drunk driver was at least indirectly free with respect 
to this.) 
But, while freedom is necessary for responsibility, it alone does 
not suffice for responsibility. Some other condition, presumably men- 
tal, must also be satisfied. (Little children, we may assume, typically 
act freely when they do what they do, but they lack the mental capacity 
to be responsible for what they do.) If Perry had intended to paralyze 
Doris, then, most would say (and I would be inclined to agree), he is 
to blame-that is, he is culpable-for doing so. But, of course, this 
was not his intention; on the contrary, his intention was to save Doris. 
In fact, he was quite ignorant of the risk of paralysis, and he's devas- 
tated by the outcome. Under these conditions, most would say (and I 
would again be inclined to agree) that Perry is not to blame for para- 
lyzing Doris, unless he is to blame for his ignorance. 
Where I would differ with most people, however, is in the assess- 
ment of what it takes for agents such as Perry to be culpable for their 
ignorance and, hence, for acting in ignorance. Most people would say, 
I believe, that the conditions for culpable ignorance are fairly easily 
and frequently satisfied, whereas I would say that the conditions are 
pretty restrictive and that therefore culpable ignorance occurs less 
frequently, perhaps far less frequently, than is commonly supposed. 
In this article I shall attempt to defend this view.2 
versity Press, 1992). Their views are discussed in my "Responsibility regarding the 
Unthinkable," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1995): 204-23, sec. 2.4. 
2. What follows builds on remarks given in my "Negligence and Moral Responsibil- 
ity," Nouls 20 (1986): 199-218, and An Essay on Moral Responsibility (Totowa, N.J.: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1988), secs. 4.1 and 4.2. It also constitutes a reply to criticisms 
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II 
Ignorance is ignorance of facts. It is the failure to know the truth. 
This can come about only by way of a failure justifiably to believe the 
truth. Such failure can itself come about in one of two ways: either 
by way of a failure to believe the truth or by way of believing the truth 
but without justification. It is not clear to me that the second of these 
can be properly said to constitute ignorance. Had Perry believed, truly 
but withoutjustification, that he ran the risk of paralyzing Doris, would 
it be correct to say that he was ignorant of this risk? Whether or not 
it would be correct to say this, the issue can be side-stepped here. For 
if Perry did have this belief but paid no heed to it and proceeded to 
pull Doris free from the wreck anyway, we would be disinclined to 
excuse him. It is only when ignorance of P is due to the failure to 
believe P that we excuse a person's acting in ignorance of P. Hence- 
forth, when I speak of ignorance, I shall mean ignorance that is consti- 
tuted by failure of belief. 
But ignorance of what, precisely? I have mentioned Perry's igno- 
rance of the risk of paralyzing Doris, but this is in fact only an indica- 
tion of the ignorance that is directly relevant to his having an excuse. 
The ignorance that is directly relevant is his ignorance of his doing 
something morally wrong (or, at least, of his running an undue risk 
of doing something morally wrong-and running such a risk is itself 
a form of wrongdoing). For suppose that he had been unaware of the 
risk of paralysis but nonetheless believed he was acting wrongly; then 
he would not have an excuse for his action after all. (I am talking of 
wrongdoing all things considered, and not merely prima facie.) Or 
suppose that he had been aware of the risk of paralysis but nonetheless 
did not believe that he was acting wrongly (he thought the risk was 
worth taking); then he would have an excuse for his action (as long 
as his ignorance concerning wrongdoing was not itself culpable). It is 
because it is likely (but not certain) that Perry's ignorance of the risk 
of paralysis brought with it an ignorance concerning wrongdoing that 
I said in the last section that I was inclined (but did not say that I was 
committed) to the view that he is not to blame for paralyzing Doris, 
unless he is to blame for his ignorance of the risk of paralysis. 
III 
The claim that Perry is to blame for paralyzing Doris only if he is to 
blame for his ignorance may appear to be plausibly supplemented 
with the claim that, under the circumstances, he is to blame for para- 
lyzing her if he is to blame for his ignorance. This latter claim is 
made in Steven Sverdlik, "Pure Negligence," American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1993): 
137-49, sec. 2. 
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important, and I shall discuss it in Section IV. But at the moment it 
is only the former claim that is at issue. For, once it is granted, we are 
forced to ask: How could it be that Perry is to blame for his ignorance? 
There is what may seem to be an easy answer to this question. (It 
is certainly a very common answer.) Perry didn't "know better" than 
to drag Doris free from the wreck; that's what his ignorance consisted 
in. But if he ought to have "known better"-if he ought to have known 
that he was thereby doing wrong- then he is to blame for not knowing 
better and, hence, to blame for the action (and its consequences) that 
he performed in this state of ignorance. 
I think this easy answer is mistaken. We must ask what is meant 
by saying that Perry ought to have known better. What type of "ought" 
is this? There are two main possibilities. 
The first possibility is that "ought" is here intended to express an 
ideal. (This is sometimes called the "ought-to-be.") But if this is what 
is meant, then the claim that in general one is responsible for not 
knowing what one ought to have known is surely to be rejected. Most, 
if not all, ignorance ought not to be, in the present sense. But much 
ignorance is such that no one is responsible for it; for much ignorance 
is unavoidable, and one cannot be to blame for what is unavoidable. 
Again, responsibility requires freedom.3 
The second possibility is that "ought" is intended to express an 
obligation. (This is sometimes called the "ought-to-do.")4 In this sense, 
to say that Perry ought to have known better is to say that he did 
wrong, all things considered, in not knowing better.5 I shall take it 
that this sense of "ought" does indeed imply "can"-that is, that that 
which one ought, in this sense, to do is something that one is free to 
do.6 In particular, then, to say that Perry ought to have known better 
is to imply that he could have known better-he was free to know 
better. Thus it would seem that our concern with freedom cannot 
3. In saying that one cannot be to blame for what is unavoidable, I mean, more 
precisely, that this is so except in Frankfurt-type situations; and such situations are not 
at issue here. (See Harry G. Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," 
Journal of Philosophy 66 [1969]: 829-39). Moreover, the claim that responsibility requires 
freedom applies even to such situations. (It is the claim that freedom requires avoidabil- 
ity that is to be rejected.) See my An Essay on Moral Responsibility, sec. 4.10. 
4. 'Ought-to-be' and 'ought-to-do' are terms used by, among others, C. D. Broad, 
Ethics (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 225 ff.; Hector-Neri Castafieda, Thinking and 
Doing (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975), chap. 7; Roderick M. Chisholm, "Practical Reason and 
the Logic of Requirement," in Practical Reason, ed. Stephan Korner (New Haven, Conn.: 
Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 11 ff.; and Fred Feldman, Doing the Best We Can 
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986), chap. 8. 
5. "Did" is to be construed broadly. Perhaps all that Perry "did" was an omission: he 
omitted to act as he ought to have acted, and his ignorance is attributable to this omission. 
6. This is controversial, of course. It is defended in my The Concept of Moral Obliga- 
tion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), sec. 3.1. 
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here be invoked to block ascriptions of responsibility, and so the way 
may seem clear to blaming Perry for his ignorance and, hence, for his 
ignorant behavior. 
It has already been noted, however, that freedom does not itself 
suffice for culpability, and now we should note that the same is true 
even if one's free action takes the particular form of wrongdoing. 
Excuses for wrongdoing are, after all, a conceptual possibility. Even 
if we grant, then, that Perry's ignorance is attributable to wrongdoing 
on his part, and hence that he was in control of it, how is it that we 
are supposed to be able to infer from this that he is culpable for it? As 
noted in the first section, in addition to freedom, some other condition, 
presumably mental, must be satisfied if one is to be responsible for 
something. Thus Perry must satisfy some such condition if he is to be 
responsible for his ignorance. What might this condition be? 
The argument at issue here can be put more fully and more 
formally as follows. Let us suppose that 
1. Perry is culpable for his ignorant behavior (i.e., for behaving 
as he did, even though he was ignorant of the fact that his 
behavior was morally wrong, all things considered). 
Given that 
2. one is culpable for behaving ignorantly only if one is culpable 
for being ignorant, 
we may infer that 
3. Perry is culpable for being ignorant. 
Further, given that 
4. one is culpable for something only if one was in control of 
that thing, 
we may infer that 
5. Perry was in control of being ignorant. 
At this point it should be recognized that 
6. no one can be in direct control of being ignorant. 
Moreover, 
7. if one is in control of something but not directly so, then one 
is in indirect, and only in indirect, control of it. 
It follows that 
8. Perry was in indirect, and only in indirect, control of being 
ignorant. 
Furthermore, with respect to the direct-indirect distinction, responsi- 
bility tracks freedom. More precisely, 
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9. if one is culpable for something but was only in indirect con- 
trol of it, then one is indirectly, and only indirectly, culpable 
for it. 
Thus 
10. Perry is indirectly, and only indirectly, culpable for being 
ignorant. 
However, just as indirect freedom presupposes direct freedom, so 
indirect responsibility presupposes direct responsibility. More pre- 
cisely, 
11. if one is indirectly, and only indirectly, culpable for some- 
thing, X, then one is directly culpable for something else, 
Y, of which X was a consequence. 
Thus 
12. Perry is directly culpable for something of which his igno- 
rance was a consequence. 
So the hunt is on for this something for which Perry is directly culpable 
and of which his ignorance was a consequence. What could this some- 
thing be? 
Before I attend to this question, let me say something about the 
premises that give rise to it. I believe that each of these premises is 
very plausible, and so my remarks here will be brief. Premise (1) is 
assumed simply for the sake of argument. Premises (2) and (4) express 
two of the assumptions made in Section I when I was setting the scene 
for the present inquiry. I have already indicated that I shall not attempt 
to defend the latter;7 the former, however, is especially important-in 
some ways it is the key premise-and I shall have more to say about 
it in Section VII below. Premises (6) and (7) presuppose a general 
distinction between direct and indirect control. One is in indirect con- 
trol of something, X, if and only if one is in control of it by way of 
being in control of something else, Y, of which X is a consequence. 
(Thus the drunk driver in the example given earlier was in indirect 
control of his driving by way of being in control of his drinking.) One 
is in direct control of something if and only if one is in control of it 
in some way that does not involve being in control of it by way of 
being in control of something else. Premise (6) is based on the observa- 
tion that, if one can avoid ignorance, one can do so only by way of 
doing something else by means of which ignorance is avoided.8 Prem- 
7. But see my "Responsibility regarding the Unthinkable," and An Essay on Moral 
Responsibility, where some defense is attempted. 
8. This will, I think, be granted by all. Even James Montmarquet, who argues that 
we can sometimes bear direct responsibility for certain doxastic states (such as whether 
we exhibit care when forming and retaining beliefs) in part because (he claims) we can 
be directly free with respect to being in such states, acknowledges that we can only be 
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ise (7) rests squarely on the accounts-admittedly rather rough-just 
given of direct and indirect control. Premises (9) and (1 1) presuppose 
a corresponding distinction between direct and indirect culpability: 
one is indirectly culpable for something, X, if and only if one is culpable 
for it by way of being culpable for something else, Y, of which X is 
or was a consequence; one is directly culpable for something if and 
only if one is culpable for it in some way that does not involve one's 
being culpable for it by way of being culpable for something else. 
Premise (9) is based on the idea (which itself constitutes a refinement 
of premise [4]) that direct culpability requires direct control, whereas 
indirect culpability requires only indirect control. (This idea is a reflec- 
tion of the purely parasitic nature of indirect control, which renders 
such control inadequate as a basis of what I call substantial culpability. 
I shall say more about this in the next section.) Finally, premise (11) 
rests squarely on the accounts just given of direct and indirect 
culpability. 
Let me now return to the question: What is that thing for which 
Perry is directly culpable and of which his ignorance (concerning the 
wrongness of his behavior when he paralyzed Doris) was a conse- 
quence? An obvious answer is this: carelessness, or inconsiderateness, 
or something of the sort. Surely, we might say, any careful or consider- 
ate person would at least have entertained the possibility of doing 
more harm than good by means of a precipitate rescue, and if Perry 
did not entertain this possibility, well, then, thatjust shows that, despite 
his good intentions, he was careless or inconsiderate and is thus the 
fitting object of blame. 
But this "obvious" answer is in fact inadequate. The question still 
remains: was Perry aware that his careless or inconsiderate behavior 
was itself morally wrong? The answer is no. Carelessness and inconsid- 
erateness typically involve a failure to believe (at the time) that one is 
being careless or inconsiderate. Even if this is not necessarily the case, 
it was clearly true of Perry; and if Perry did not believe that he was 
being careless or inconsiderate, then a fortiori he did not believe that 
he was acting wrongly by way of being careless or inconsiderate. Thus 
the argument would apply all over again: just as Perry's culpability 
for paralyzing Doris is, because it was done in ignorance, to be traced 
to culpability for something else, namely, his acting in a careless or 
inconsiderate manner, so too his culpability for acting in this manner 
must itself, because it too was done in ignorance, be traced to yet 
something else. The hunt is still on. 
indirectly free with respect to the presence or absence of particular beliefs. See James 
Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1993), pp. 45-46, and "Culpable Ignorance and Excuses," Philosophical Stud- 
ies 80 (1995): 41-49, esp. pp. 42-43. 
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But, it may be retorted, all that Perry had to do was pay attention 
to what he was doing, and this was something he could have done; 
indeed, it was something that he had direct control over. Thus his 
culpability may be traced to his inattentiveness, and, since his control 
over this was direct, we need hunt no further than that. 
Again, this won't do. Let me grant (although in fact I have serious 
reservations about this) that attentiveness to what one is doing is typi- 
cally in one's control and, indeed, directly so.' The fact remains that 
such control does not itself suffice for culpability. Granted, Perry was 
inattentive to certain aspects of his rescue of Doris; and had he paid 
attention to these aspects-something which, I am conceding for the 
sake of argument, he could have done-he could and, we hope, would 
have gone about the rescue in a different way. But so what? He was 
ignorant of the need to pay such attention, that is, of the wrongness 
of his not paying such attention. And so the argument applies yet 
again: just as Perry's culpability for acting in a careless or inconsiderate 
manner is, because it was done in ignorance, to be traced to something 
else, namely, his failure to pay attention to what he was doing (if, 
indeed, this was something else),'0 so too his culpability for failing to 
pay attention to what he was doing must, because it too was done in 
ignorance, be traced to yet something else. The fact (if it is a fact) that 
Perry was directly in control of his inattentiveness is of no moment. 
He must also have been in indirect control of it.11 At least, this is so 
if he is to be culpable for it, since he was ignorant with respect to it. 
By now the moral should be obvious. It is clearly futile to search 
for something for which Perry might be directly culpable but concern- 
ing whose wrongness he was ignorant. For, by the foregoing argument, 
he could be culpable for this thing only if he were culpable for the 
ignorance with which it was performed, and this ignorance would be 
something for which he is and could only be indirectly culpable. Hence 
culpability for ignorant behavior must be rooted in culpability that 
involves no ignorance.12 
9. Regarding my reservations, see my "The Range of Options," American Philosophi- 
cal Quarterly 27 (1990): 345-55, esp. sec. 5. 
10. I shall leave open just what the relation is between Perry's being inattentive 
and his being careless or inconsiderate. 
11. Compare: if I am now directly in control of, say, paying attention to what I 
am now writing, then yesterday I was indirectly in control of this; for my present 
attentiveness is itself a consequence of certain things I did yesterday. Had I gone on 
vacation yesterday, I would not be writing these words today. 
12. This conclusion is missed even by Holly Smith, who is perhaps closer to ac- 
cepting it than anyone other than myself who has written on the topic. While in "Culpa- 
ble Ignorance," Philosophical Review 92 (1983): 543-7 1, she gives an account of culpable 
ignorance according to which all responsibility for such ignorance is rooted in something 
else (which she calls a "benighting act") for which one is culpable, she fails to acknowl- 
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In summary, then, my argument is simply this. If one is culpable 
for nonignorant behavior, then, of course, one's culpability involves 
a lack of ignorance. If, in contrast, one is culpable for ignorant behav- 
ior, then one is culpable for the ignorance to which this behavior may 
be traced. Hence one's culpability for one's ignorant behavior, at least, 
is merely indirect. But one is never in direct control of whether one 
is ignorant. Hence one's culpability for one's ignorance is also merely 
indirect. Indirect culpability for something presupposes direct culpa- 
bility for something else. Whatever this something else is, it cannot 
be ignorant behavior, because then the argument would apply all over 
again to this behavior. Hence all culpability can be traced to culpability 
that involves lack of ignorance, that is, that involves a belief on the 
agent's part that he or she is doing something morally wrong. 
IV 
It might be thought that, even if the conclusionjust reached is granted, 
it still does not warrant the claim that I made earlier, namely, that 
responsibility for ignorance, and for ignorant behavior, occurs less 
frequently, perhaps far less frequently, than is commonly supposed. 
After all, even if one cannot be directly culpable for something without 
having a belief about wrongdoing that concerns it, and even if this 
constitutes a restriction on culpability that is not commonly acknowl- 
edged, it doesn't follow that one cannot be indirectly culpable for 
something without having a belief about wrongdoing that concerns 
it. Thus the opportunities for culpability for ignorance, which is neces- 
sarily indirect, might well remain quite plentiful. 
This conclusion is premature. As far as I can tell, tracing culpable 
ignorance to such nonignorant origins would indeed require us to cut 
back fairly drastically on the frequency with which we ascribe culpabil- 
ity for ignorance. But, aside from this, there is another point to be 
made, one that requires us to pay attention to the following question: 
For exactly which consequences, of those things for which we are 
directly culpable, are we indirectly culpable? 
Surely no one wants to answer "all," nor even, "all those over 
which we have or had control." For this would be far too sweeping. 
Who would want to claim, for instance, that a liar is to blame for 
the disturbance of air molecules that occurs as a consequence of the 
utterance of a lie? 
There are some who answer "none."13 There is a sense in which 
I think this answer must be right. That sense is the following: the 
edge that culpability requires, at bottom, a belief concerning wrongdoing (pp. 547-48, 
556). This failure is repeated in Smith's "Varieties of Moral Worth and Moral Credit," 
Ethics 101 (1991): 279-303, esp. pp. 279-80. 
13. Compare Smith on what she calls the 'Liberal View' in "Culpable Ignorance." 
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extent or degree to which one is to blame when one is directly culpable 
for something cannot be increased by anything that occurs as a conse- 
quence of that thing (unless one is also directly culpable for this conse- 
quence). Suppose, for example, that Shirley shot Dan and that Dan 
consequently died. Dan's death added nothing to the extent to which 
Shirley is to blame. Although Dan's death may have added to the 
number of things for which Shirley is to blame, it did not increase the 
degree to which she is to blame. Given his death, she may be to blame 
for more, but she is no more to blame than she would be had his death 
not occurred. The reason for this is that Shirley was only indirectly in 
control of Dan's death. That is, she was in direct control of something 
of which Dan's death was a consequence, and only in this way did she 
have control over Dan's death. This means that Dan's death was not 
in Shirley's control except insofar as this something was in her control. 
In a sense, then, her control ended with this something; whether Dan's 
death occurred as a result was, beyond that point, not up to her but 
(as it is sometimes put) up to nature.14 Her control did not extend 
beyond this something with respect to which she was directly free; 
there was no fresh injection of freedom beyond that point. Given that 
responsibility tracks freedom, there was therefore no fresh injection 
of responsibility beyond that point; her responsibility was not ex- 
tended, its degree was not increased, by Dan's death. 
Let us say that one is substantially culpable for something if and 
only if one's being culpable for it contributes to the extent or degree 
to which one is to blame. According to the argumentjust given (which 
is admittedly pretty compact), one is not substantially culpable for 
something of which one was only indirectly in control and hence for 
which one is, at best, only indirectly culpable.'5 If one is only indirectly 
culpable for something, then one is only indirectly in control of it; 
any such control is purely parasitic on one's direct control over some- 
thing else, and any such culpability is likewise purely parasitic on one's 
direct culpability for something else. Even if Shirley is culpable for 
Dan's death, then, she is not substantially culpable for it. 
If this is correct, then there is a sense in which no one is ever 
culpable for any ignorance concerning wrongdoing (since no one can 
be directly culpable for it), let alone for any behavior attributable to 
such ignorance. That sense is simply this: no one is ever substantially 
culpable for such ignorance or for behavior performed in such igno- 
rance. In this sense, Perry is not responsible for paralyzing Doris. 
But this is not the only respectable sense at hand. As I have just 
14. Donald Davidson uses the phrase "up to nature" in his Essays on Actions and 
Events (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), p. 59. 
15. For a less compact version of the argument, see my An Essay on Moral Responsi- 
bility, secs. 3.3 and 4.11. 
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acknowledged, we may indeed be tempted to say that Shirley is culpa- 
ble for Dan's death, even if she is not substantially culpable for it. Why 
say this, if her culpability in this regard must be empty or insubstantial? 
How is this any more appropriate than blaming the liar for the distur- 
bance of air molecules? The answer, surely, is that, even if the liar 
satisfies the freedom condition for culpability with respect to this dis- 
turbance, he (or she) presumably fails to satisfy the relevant mental 
condition. Even if there were somehow something morally wrong with 
his disturbance of air molecules, he was ignorant of this. But the same 
may well not be true of Shirley. In fact, let us now assume that Shirley 
freely and intentionally killed Dan, believing this to be wrong. This 
suffices, I believe, for her to incur culpability in this regard. Suppose 
that it is for her decision to shoot Dan that Shirley is directly culpable. 
Then, even though she is not substantially culpable for any conse- 
quence of this decision' (including Dan's death), still it seems appro- 
priate to say that she is culpable for his death. For her decision to 
shoot Dan was based on her belief that she would thereby bring about 
his death. In that sense, his death was "cognitively connected" to her 
decision, and thus to her too, and its occurrence thereby serves to 
indicate, even if only indirectly, what it is that Shirley is substantially 
culpable for. Although Dan's death does not add to the extent of 
Shirley's culpability, it is indicative of the extent to which she is 
culpable. 
In the absence of any such cognitive connection between that 
for which an agent is directly culpable and its consequences, these 
consequences are not indicative of the extent to which the agent is 
culpable, and hence it seems quite inappropriate to say that the agent 
is culpable for them, even indirectly. The implication of this observa- 
tion with respect to the case of Perry and Doris is of course that for 
Perry to be culpable for his ignorance, or for his attempt (made in 
ignorance) to rescue Doris, or for his paralyzing Doris (in ignorance), 
there must be some cognitive connection between these states or events 
and that state or event for which Perry is directly culpable and of 
which they are consequences. Now, this sort of thing can happen. 
Imagine, for example, that Perry had signed up for some training in 
first aid but had deliberately decided to skip the session having to do 
with the treatment of accident victims, despite believing that he ought 
not to skip it precisely because he would remain ignorant about how 
to treat such victims. In such a case, he may well be directly culpable 
for his decision to skip the session, and on this basis it may well be 
appropriate to hold him indirectly culpable for his ignorance concern- 
16. Unless she happens also to be directly free with respect to such a consequence. 
Compare n. 11 above. 
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ing how to treat Doris and for his attempt to rescue her.'7 (Whether 
it would be appropriate to hold him culpable for paralyzing her is 
another matter; this would depend on whether, at the time of his 
decision to skip the session, he contemplated some such consequence 
of his attempting to rescue someone while ignorant of how best to 
treat accident victims.) But it seems plain that, although this sort of 
thing can happen, it is far more often the case that when people 
engage in precipitate actions like Perry's there is no such cognitive 
connection between these precipitate actions and their consequences, 
on the one hand, and some prior event, on the other, for which these 
people are directly culpable. It is commonly supposed that such agents 
are nonetheless to blame for these actions and their consequences; 
but this is a mistake. 
V 
Indeed, there is yet a further restriction on responsibility for ignorance 
that I believe should be acknowledged. It is this: not only is one 
responsible only for those things to which one is cognitively connected, 
but this connection must involve one's adverting to those things as well. 
I have argued that all culpability involves a belief on the agent's 
part that he or she is doing something morally wrong. However, beliefs 
can be merely dispositional, rather than occurrent. If one believes 
merely dispositionally that, in doing some act, one is doing wrong, then 
one need not advert to that act. For to advert to it is to contemplate it, 
to hold it consciously before one's mind. 
But while beliefs presumably can be merely dispositional, it is, I 
believe, occurrent beliefs about wrongdoing that are, with one possible 
exception, required for culpability; and such beliefs involve adver- 
tence. The reason is this. With one possible exception, if a belief is 
not occurrent, then one cannot act either with the intention to heed 
the belief or with the intention not to heed it; if one has no such 
intention, then one cannot act either deliberately on or deliberately 
despite the belief; if this is so, then the belief plays no role in the 
reason for which one performs one's action; and one incurs culpability 
17. Note that, while it cannot of course be that Perry both is to-blame and is not 
to-blame for his attempt to rescue Doris, it can be that he both is to-blame and is not- 
to-blame for this. Indeed, he might even be both culpable and laudable for it. This is 
because, while he may be culpable for it by virtue of being directly culpable for his 
decision to skip his first aid session, he may also be laudable for it by virtue of his being 
directly laudable for his decision to risk his life for the sake of another. Such "conflicting" 
multiple evaluations are perfectly consistent with one another. While we must not 
ignore the bad intentions involved in the earlier decision to skip class, we must likewise 
not ignore the good intentions involved in the later decision to rescue. See my An Essay 
on Moral Responsibility, pp. 59-60, and "A Plea for Ambivalence," Metaphilosophy 24 
(1993): 382-89. 
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for one's action only if one's belief concerning wrongdoing plays a 
role in the reason for which one performs the action. Suppose, for 
example, that Perry did skip a first aid session and that he believed at 
the time that it was wrong for him to do this; but suppose that this 
belief was merely dispositional. Then it follows that, with one possible 
exception, this belief played no role in the reason for his skipping the 
session and, hence, that he is not culpable for his decision to do so,'8 
even though he believed it was wrong to do so. 
The one possible exception is this: it may be that routine or 
habitual actions are performed for reasons to which one does not 
advert. It may also be that some people engage in deliberate wrongdo- 
ing in a routine or habitual, and hence inadvertent, manner. To the 
extent that this is so, the present considerations concerning advertence 
do not apply. But to the extent that this is not so, they do apply. So 
there is this further restriction on culpability: in cases other than those 
of routine or habitual actions, one incurs culpability for something 
only if one's cognitive connection to that thing involves one's adverting 
to it. 
VI 
Regardless of this question of advertence, all moral ignorance can be 
traced to one or the other of two sources: nonmoral error and moral 
error. Perry's ignorance concerning his doing wrong in dragging Doris 
free from the wreck is presumably to be traced to his ignorance con- 
cerning the risk of paralysis. This latter ignorance constitutes a non- 
moral error (an error concerning a nonmoral fact). But Perry's igno- 
rance concerning wrongdoing could conceivably have stemmed from 
a different source. For instance, he might have believed that if he was 
in a position to drag someone free from a wreck, he might do wrong 
in doing so, and also have believed that he was in such a position with 
respect to Doris, and yet have failed to make the simple inference that 
he might do wrong in dragging Doris free from the wreck. This is 
bizarre; if it had occurred, however, Perry's ignorance concerning his 
doing wrong in dragging Doris free from the wreck is to be traced to 
another type of nonmoral error (an error in reasoning). Or again, 
Perry's ignorance concerning wrongdoing might have stemmed from 
his being ignorant of there being anything morally questionable about 
harming people. This is grotesque; if it had occurred, however, his 
ignorance concerning wrongdoing is to be traced to a type of moral 
error (an error concerning a moral fact). 
Now, there are some who claim that it is easier to excuse moral 
ignorance that is due to nonmoral error than moral ignorance that is 
18. Unless, of course, he is indirectly culpable for this decision by way of being 
directly culpable for some yet earlier event. 
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due to moral error.19 I see no reason to think that this is so. The 
argument of Section III applies in both cases. Even if Perry's ignorance 
concerning wrongdoing were to be traced to his being ignorant of 
there being anything morally questionable about harming people, this 
latter ignorance would be culpable only if it in turn could be traced to 
some episode where Perry was not ignorant concerning wrongdoing. 
VII 
An argument is only as strong as its weakest premise. The central 
argument in this article is the one presented in Section III. I attempted 
in that section to say something briefly in defense of each of its prem- 
ises, but it is worth inquiring further into the first general assumption, 
which is what gets the argument rolling. 
I have said that most people would agree that Perry is not to 
blame for his ignorant behavior unless he is to blame for his ignorance. 
This is clearly an instance of the claim that constitutes the first gen- 
eral assumption: 
2. one is culpable for behaving ignorantly only if one is culpable 
for being ignorant. 
But, while most would agree with this, why should we agree with it? 
This is an important question, because it would clearly be a mistake 
to accept (2) on the basis of accepting the following yet more gen- 
eral statement: 
2*. one is culpable for behaving X-ishly only if one is culpable 
for being X-ish. 
There are many counterexamples to this more general claim. For 
example, one might be culpable for behaving angrily without being 
culpable for being angry; so too for behaving cruelly and being cruel; 
and so on. Why, then, should ignorance be an exception? 
We should distinguish acting angrily-acting from anger-and 
acting while angry. ("Acting in anger" is ambiguous between the two, 
although it is typically used to mean the former.) If one acts from 
anger, one's action issues from one's anger; one's anger serves to 
explain one's action. If one acts while angry, one's action need not 
issue from one's anger. This seems important, for it helps explain how 
it can happen that one is culpable for acting angrily even though not 
culpable for being angry. On some occasions, one cannot help being 
angry and thus is not culpable for being angry. On such occasions, 
one cannot avoid its being the case that, if one acts, one acts while 
19. The locus classicus: Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics bk. 3, chaps. 1 and 5. See 
Lloyd Fields, "Moral Beliefs and Blameworthiness," Philosophy 69 (1994): 397-415, for 
a recent defense of this claim. This issue is put to one side in Sverdlik, p. 139. 
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angry. Still one might be able to avoid acting angrily, and so one might 
be responsible for acting angrily. 
It may initially seem that ignorance differs from anger in this 
regard. It may seem that there is no ambiguity to "acting in ignorance," 
in that there is no distinction to be drawn between acting igno- 
rantly-acting from ignorance-and acting while ignorant. If this 
were so, then, if one's ignorance were unavoidable, one could also not 
avoid its being the case that, if one acted, one acted ignorantly. And 
this might seem to help explain why it is that (2) is true but (2*) is not. 
But I think this would be a mistake. There is a distinction to 
be drawn between acting ignorantly-acting from ignorance-and 
acting while ignorant.20 (Thus "acting in ignorance" is ambiguous after 
all, although, again, I think it is typically used to mean the former.) 
Perry acted from ignorance; his ignorance issued in his action; his 
ignorance serves to explain his action. He did not merely act while 
ignorant. Moreover, it seems that he could have avoided its being the 
case that, if he acted, he acted from ignorance, even if it were true 
(as I have not been supposing) that he could not have avoided being 
ignorant. For recall that the ignorance in question is his ignorance of 
doing wrong in the attempt to rescue Doris. Even if it were true that 
he could not have avoided being ignorant in this regard, he could 
have avoided acting from such ignorance simply by not making the 
attempt to rescue Doris (and he could have avoided making this 
attempt). 
So the question remains: Why accept (2)? The answer, I think, is 
this. What distinguishes acting angrily from acting ignorantly does 
not have to do with the avoidability of acting in these ways. It has to 
do with the fact that, typically, one can act angrily while being aware 
that one ought not to perform the act in question, whereas one clearly 
cannot act from ignorance (or even merely while ignorant) of the fact 
that one ought not to perform the act in question while being aware 
that one ought not to perform it. Thus one can be culpable for acting 
angrily in a way in which one cannot be culpable for acting ignorantly. 
This stems, I believe, from the fact that lack of ignorance is a root 
requirement for responsibility. Given that it is such a requirement, (2) 
is true.21 But while I think that this does help explain why (2) is true, 
20. Compare Aristotle bk. 3, chap. 1. 
21. Indeed, the foregoing considerations imply that (2) would be true even if it 
were modified as follows: one is culpable for doing some act either from ignorance of 
the fact that one ought not to do it or merely while ignorant of the fact that one ought 
not to do it, only if one is culpable for being ignorant of this fact. But in fact there is 
some reason to think that this modification of (2) should be rejected. For if someone 
acts merely while ignorant of the wrongness of his (or her) action, this is an indication 
that he would have acted in the same way even if he had not been so ignorant. If such 
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clearly I cannot appeal to it when using (2) in an attempt to show that 
lack of ignorance is a root requirement for responsibility; for that 
would be to beg the question. Since I don't know how else one might 
try to justify (2), I shall not seek to establish it here but will rest content 
with the observation that even those who seem most strongly opposed 
to the idea that lack of ignorance is a root requirement for responsibil- 
ity appear to accept it.22 
VIII 
There has been much discussion recently of such moral vices as racism, 
sexism, and the like. I would think that it frequently (but by no means 
necessarily) happens that people who manifest these vices are oblivious 
to the wrongness involved in their doing so.23 Insofar as this is so, the 
foregoing argument applies, and the result is that responsibility for 
these vices and the vicious behavior in which they issue is incurred 
less frequently, perhaps far less frequently, than is commonly sup- 
posed. This is an unwelcome conclusion to many. Several recent arti- 
cles urge that we acknowledge that people are frequently to blame for 
engaging in such behavior, even though they engage in it in ignorance. 
They have taken pains to show how it is that, contrary to the assertions 
of many, such vices, and the consequent behavior, are often in the 
agent's control.24 Some have emphasized, too, that the agent is often 
aware how to exercise this control.25 Some have emphasized how it is 
that the agent can often control whether he or she remains ignorant 
of the wrongness of engaging in such vicious behavior. 26 But we can 
ignorance plays no role in the explanation of his action, why excuse him? There may 
be something to this. It may be that such a person should be said to be culpable in 
some way, even if he is not culpable for his ignorance. If so, this would be an exception 
to the claim that lack of ignorance is a root requirement of responsibility. See the 
discussion of what I have called 'situational culpability' in an Essay on Moral Responsibility, 
pp. 135 ff. (What is said there itself needs elaboration.) Such culpability, if it exists, 
would also cast doubt on the claim that freedom is a root requirement of responsibility. 
It is not clear to me that we should accept the possibility of such culpability. Accepting 
it requires accepting not just that certain counterfactual statements about people's 
motives and behavior make sense and may be true but also that whether or not someone 
is actually culpable can be a function of such counterfactual considerations. 
22. For example, Sverdlik, p. 141; Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Re- 
sponsibility, p. 3, and "Culpable Ignorance and Excuses," pp. 44-45. 
23. Compare the discussion in Fred E. Katz, Ordinary People and Extraordinary Evil 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993). 
24. For example, William Lyons, Emotion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1980), pp. 202-6; Carl Elliott, "Beliefs and Responsibility,"Journal of Value Inquiry 25 
(1991): 233-48, esp. p. 239; Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility, 
pp. 1 ff. 
25. For example, Larry May, "Insensitivity and Moral Responsibility," Journal of 
Value Inquiry 26 (1992): 7-22, esp. pp. 19-20. 
26. For example, Michele Moody-Adams, "Culture, Responsibility, and Affected 
Ignorance," Ethics 104 (1994): 291-309, esp. pp. 296 ff. 
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grant (indeed, I think we should grant) that all this is true, without 
granting that the agent is responsible either for the vices in question or 
for the consequent vicious behavior. For lack of ignorance concerning 
wrongdoing is a root requirement of responsibility. One can have 
control over one's vicious behavior, one can have control over one's 
vices, one can be aware that one has such control, and one can have 
control over whether one remains ignorant of the associated wrong- 
ness, without actually being aware of the associated wrongness. And, 
absent such awareness, one is not responsible. 
Let me end by noting that even if in many cases people are not 
culpable for (e.g.) their racism-their racist views and their racist 
behavior-this of course does not mean that there is nothing to be 
criticized, morally, in such cases. Racism is a moral vice, regardless of 
whether one is morally responsible for it; having racist views is morally 
reprehensible, and acting on them is morally wrong. Ascriptions of 
responsibility constitute only one of several ways to engage in moral 
evaluation.27 
27. See my An Essay on Moral Responsibility, sec. 4.9, and "A Plea for Ambivalence" 
for further discussion of this point. 
